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OUTPUT EFFECT OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
Sinchit Lai*
ABSTRACT
A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws
on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a
positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the
effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement.
To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust
case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S.
data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust
association between private enforcement and output on a national
level in the short run over the period from 1954 to 2019. However, I
do not find a robust association between the two in the long run. In
view of the results, I hypothesize a mechanism of an adverse effect
of private antitrust enforcement on output in the short run.
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I. INTRODUCTION: MECHANISM OF POSITIVE IMPACT
A. ANTITRUST AND LONG-RUN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Governments around the globe are increasingly interested in
assessing the impact of their competition policies and the effectiveness
of their antitrust authorities.1 Measuring the effects of competition law
and its enforcement benefits societies in at least three ways. First,
evaluations allow legislators and the public to hold antitrust authorities
accountable for their work.2 Second, such measurement can help
antitrust authorities identify and learn from poor enforcement decisions,
hence improving their enforcement quality.3 Third, evaluation studies
facilitate the overall design of competition regimes.4 In light of these
advantages, from time to time, governments require their antitrust
authorities to show evidence on the links between competition,
competition policy, and various macroeconomic outcomes.5 Economic
growth is one of the macro-outcomes governments are concerned
about.6
In the long run, competition policies affect economic growth by
altering total factor productivity (hereinafter productivity). In 1956,
Robert Solow, an economist who later received the Nobel prize,
introduced a long-run growth model.7 The Solow model suggests that a
rise in productivity drives the economy to grow.8 Productivity growth
drives economic growth and reflects a more efficient use of production
inputs, such as labor and capital.9 In the field of antitrust, the currently
prevailing view is that competition enhances productivity, which in turn

1. See generall! ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., FACTSHEET ON HOW
COMPETITION POLICY AFFECTS MACRO-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES (2014), https://www.
oecd.org/daf/competition/2014-competition-factsheet-iv-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MCF3-C4XR].
2. Henk Don et al., Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law
Enforcement, 156 DE ECONOMIST 341, 343 (2008).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id.
7. See generall! Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theor! of Economic
Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65 (1956).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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promotes economic growth.10 Theoretically, stronger competition leads
to higher productivity through three mechanisms. First, firms can
quickly enter and exit the market when it is competitive.11 Under such a
market condition, more productive firms enter the market to gain market
share and eliminate less productive firms (across-firms effect).12 Second,
under intense competition, firms raise managerial efforts to minimize
costs to avoid being driven out of the market (within-firms effect).13
Third, and most importantly, competition drives higher productivity by
encouraging firms to innovate.14 Through innovations, firms can
outperform their competitors by gaining a cost advantage, differentiating
their products, or bringing new products to the market.15 Multiple
empirical studies have been conducted to show a positive relationship
between antitrust and productivity.16
Other scholars have conducted empirical studies to explore the link
between antitrust and economic growth directly.17 Although different
methods have been employed, a strong majority have found a positive

10.
11.
12.

ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
Id.; COMPETITION & MKT. AUTH., PRODUCTIVITY

AND COMPETITION 15-16
(2015),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/443448/Productivity_and_competition_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M8VHP9S].
13. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 1, at 2; COMPETITION & MKT.
AUTH., supra note 12, at 14-15.
14. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 1, at 3; COMPETITION & MKT.
AUTH., supra note 12, at 16-18.
15. COMP. & MKT. AUTH., supra note 12, at 16-18.
16. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 1, at 22; COMP. & MKT. AUTH.,
supra note 12, at 10-13.
17. See generall! Mark A. Dutz & Aydin Hayri, Does More Intensive Competition
Lead to Higher Growth? (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2320, 2000),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/419001468739337795/pdf/multi-page.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LN3Z-SMDP]; AUSTL. GOV’T, PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, REVIEW OF
NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY REFORMS (2005); Hiau Looi Kee & Bernard
Hoekman, Imports, Entr! and Competition Law as Market Disciplines, 51 EURO. ECON.
REV. 831 (2007); Joseph A. Clougherty, Competition Polic! Trends and Economic
Growth: Cross-National Empirical Evidence, 17 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 111 (2010); TayCheng Ma, The Effect of Competition Law Enforcement on Economic Growth, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 301 (2011); Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion
of Democrac! and Economic Growth, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 593 (2013).
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and robust relationship between the two.18 Many of these studies utilized
the typical research methodology of undertaking a regression analysis
using cross-country data.19 One study, in order to quantify the impact of
antitrust in the long run, lagged its variables.20 Alternatively, a few
studies evaluated the long-term effect by examining the average annual
growth rate of real output (sometimes per capita) over several years as
their dependent variable.21 An advantage of (or a need for) employing an
average growth rate over the years is that it smooths out any business
cycle effects.22 Then, to model the existence or intensity of antitrust
laws, these studies control for one of four variables of interest, each with
its own limitations. For the first variable, most authors control for the
effect of competition law by a dummy variable (i.e., a one if competition
law exists and a zero otherwise).23 The shortcoming of using such binary
coding is that it focuses on the law but not its implementation.24 As
another variable option, Tay-Cheng Ma controlled for a SCOPE index,
18. See Dutz & Hayri, supra note 17; AUSTL. GOV’T, PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N,
supra note 17; Kee & Hoekman, supra note 17; Clougherty, supra note 17; Ma, supra
note 17; Petersen, supra note 17. Kee and Hoekman find no significant effect of
competition laws on economic growth. However, this result should be read in caution
because, due to data constraints, the authors used growth rate of value added per unit of
capital instead of the growth rate of real output as the dependent variable. Kee &
Hoekman, supra note 17, at 838.
19. In the field of antitrust, cross-country data is commonly used to measure not
only economic growth, but also other macro aggregates, such as price-cost margins and
productivity. See, e.g., Mats A. Bergman, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Or
Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement, 156 DE
ECONOMIST 387, 399-401 (2008); Stephen W. Davies & Peter L. Ormosi, A
Comparative Assessment of Methodologies Used to Evaluate Competition Polic!, 782 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 769, 782 (2012).
20. See Petersen, supra note 17, at 611.
21. See Dutz & Hayri, supra note 17, at 6; Ma, supra note 17, at 312; Clougherty,
supra note 17, at 122.
22. Clougherty, supra note 17, at 121.
23. In regression analysis, a dummy variable is a numerical variable used to
represent categorical data, such as gender. A dummy variable takes on values of 0 or 1,
indicating the presence or absence of an attribute (e.g., a 0 may indicate a male and 1
may indicate a female). DAMODAR N. GUJARATI & DAWN C. PORTER, ESSENTIALS OF
ECONOMETRICS 178-80 (4th ed. 2010). See also Petersen, supra note 17, at 605-07.
24. Petersen, supra note 17, at 605. See generall! Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt,
Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Facts of Newl! Enacted
Competition Laws, SSRN (Feb. 8, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2392780
[https://perma.cc/UE98-B6F2].
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an index constructed by Keith Hylton and Fei Deng.25 Hylton and Deng
surveyed 102 countries between 2001 and 2004 and then summed scores
for the various aspects of antitrust into an overall index for each
country.26 The downside of the SCOPE index is that it exists exclusively
in a cross-sectional form, meaning that it can only be applied in panel
data analysis.27 Employing a third alternative, Mark A. Dutz and Aydin
Hayri used independent variables, such as how businesses perceive the
effectiveness of a nation’s competition policy, as a proxy for the
intensity of competition.28 However, some scholars criticized this
strategy, arguing that perceived effectiveness is subjective and could be
influenced by the effectiveness of policy in other areas.29 A fourth and
final possibility was undertaken by Joseph A. Clougherty, controlling
for budgets committed to competition policy.30 The author merely
showed that an increase in the antitrust budget matched workload
increases related to mergers and acquisitions.31 Therefore, it is unclear
how such budget affects cartel and monopoly enforcement. I will
discuss Clougherty more below.
B. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND SHORT-RUN OUTPUT EFFECT
As seen, antitrust could promote economic growth by boosting
productivity. However, it takes time for productivity to rise. This is
because the entry and exit of firms, adjustment of managerial incentives,
and innovation often do not occur overnight. Thus, economic growth
driven by productivity growth is a rather long-run process.
Antitrust also has an immediate and positive impact on national
output. Such a short-run output effect is driven by the desistance and

25.
26.

Ma, supra note 17, at 309.
Id.; Keith Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical
Anal!sis of the Scope of Competition-Enhancing Policies on Productivit!, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2007).
27. Gutmann & Voigt, supra note 24, at 6.
28. Dutz & Hayri, supra note 17, at 2-5.
29. Stefan Voigt, The Effects of Competition Polic! on Development- CrossCountr! Evidence Using Four New Indicators, 45 J. DEV. STUD. 1225, 1230 (2009);
Paolo Buccirossi et al., Competition Polic! and Productivit! Growth: An Empirical
Assessment, 95 REV. ECON. STAT. 1324, 1325 (2013).
30. Clougherty, supra note 17, at 113.
31. Id. at 114, 118.

2022]

OUTPUT EFFECT OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT

483

deterrence effects of antitrust enforcement.32 The mechanism behind this
is straightforward!a reversal of wrongdoings. Economics teach us that
the primary harm of anti-competitive conduct (i.e. wrongdoings) is a
decline in output and a rise in price.33 Therefore, when a cartel or
monopoly is being detected and sued, it probably wants to cease its
illegal conduct, meaning that the wrongdoer will restore competition;
this is the desistance effect.34 As a result, output will rise, and prices will
drop immediately.35 Moreover, such a desistance effect extends to other
wrongdoers that remain hidden.36 After witnessing a wrongdoer being
sued, offenders in other markets might worry about being sued
themselves and cease their anti-competitive conduct.37 This response
also causes output to rise and prices to drop.38 Similarly, suing a
wrongdoer warns would-be lawbreakers and discourages some of them
from starting illegal conduct, producing a deterrence effect.39 If we
believe there is natural growth in the number of cartels over time, then
the deterrence effect of antitrust enforcement reduces the decrease in
output and increases the prices across the nation.40
Currently, there is only one empirical study that reveals the shortrun output effect of antitrust enforcement. Clougherty conducted a
cross-country study of 32 antitrust jurisdictions (mainly Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members) from

32. See Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, Antitrust Penalties and the
Implications of Empirical Evidence on Cartel Overcharges, 123 ECON. J. 558, 559
(2013) (pointing out that enforcement could stop anticompetition conduct through
deterrence or desistance).
33. The harm of anticompetitive conduct includes, but is not limited to, increasing
prices, reducing outputs, hindering innovation, and slowing down economic growth.
Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27,
27 (2003).
34. Paolo Buccirossi et al., Measuring the Deterrence Properties of Competition
Polic!: The Competition Polic! Inde"es, 7 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 165, 168 n.8 (2011).
35. See Gregory J. Werden, Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the
United States, 156 DE ECONOMIST 433, 434-37 (2008) (discussing price effects of cartel
and cartel enforcement).
36. Buccirossi et al., supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. Reversing the harm of anticompetitive conduct. See Werden, supra note 35
(explaining the harm of anticompetitive conduct).
39. Katsoulacos & Ulph, supra note 32.
40. Reversing the harm of anticompetitive conduct. See Werden, supra note 35.
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1992 to 2007.41 This study explores the impact of the antitrust budget on
economic growth.42 Here, antitrust funding is used as a proxy for
antitrust workloads.43 Clougherty uses not only the average annual
growth rate of output over five years as a dependent variable, but also
yearly observations.44 The former essentially investigates the long-run
growth effect, while the latter investigates the short-run output effect.45
Clougherty found that raising competition policy funding increases the
percentage change in real per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) in
both the short and long runs.46 However, this study has two
shortcomings. First, as mentioned, the author shows a positive
relationship between antitrust funding and M&A workloads47 but does
not mention the impact on other critical antitrust workloads such as
cartel and monopoly enforcement. Second, endogeneity issues are not
addressed in this study.48 For instance, while Clougherty wants to claim
that a rise in antitrust workload has caused a higher percentage change
in real per-capita GDP,49 the causal relationship between the two
variables, if it actually exists, could have worked in the opposite
direction (i.e., a rise in real pre-capita GDP caused a higher antitrust
workload).
Another limitation of Clougherty’s work is that antitrust law could
be enforced not only by the government (public enforcement) but also
victims (private enforcement). Since Clougherty adopts the antitrust
budget as the variable of interest, his work only reveals the impact of

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Clougherty, supra note 17, at 112-13.
Id. at 113-14.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Clougherty uses yearly growth as dependent variable in order to smooth out
business cycle effects. Id. at 121-22. In addition to Clougherty, I also found that Taylor,
and Gutman and Voigt use yearly output as the dependent variable when exploring the
impact of antitrust on output (i.e. showing a short-run effect). Taylor and Gutman and
Voigt are different from Clougherty because the former study the impact of the
existence or suspension of a competition law, while the latter study the impact of the
enforcement of a competition law. See Jason E. Taylor, Output Effects of Government
Sponsored Cartels During the New Deal, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 1, 4-8 (2002); Gutmann &
Voigt, supra note 24, at 9.
46. Clougherty, supra note 17, at 123.
47. Id. at 114, 118.
48. Gutmann & Voigt, supra note 24, at 4.
49. Clougherty, supra note 17, at 114, 118.
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public enforcement on output.50 This means that there has been no work
done to quantify private enforcement’s output effect. Considering the
growing importance of private enforcement around the globe, this gap in
the literature needs to be filled. To do so, this Article employs private
antitrust case filing data in the United States from 1954 to 2019 and
evaluates the impact of private enforcement on domestic output. The
United States is an ideal target for this empirical study because it has
more private cases than most, if not all, other countries. For example,
between 2009 and 2018, on average, private plaintiffs brought 658
antitrust cases to the U.S. federal district courts each year.51 This
amounts to approximately 97 percent of total antitrust cases filed in the
country over the decade.52 Countries with only a few private cases
recorded are likely to not be suitable for a nationwide study. This is
because any effects that private enforcement may have might not be
substantial enough to cause a notable change to output on a national
level but might be observable on the industry level. Note that the dataset
created for this project does not cover the years before 1954 because I
am constrained by the availability of data.53 In addition, I use the
number of cases filed rather than the number of cases decided as a
measure of private antitrust enforcement, because there is not a robust
dataset of private antitrust decisions ready for use. And, as I will explain
later, private antitrust enforcement could have an impact on output as
early as in the filing stage.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Part II
discusses my empirical model and the variables used; Part III presents

50.
51.

Id.
Figure based on data reported under table C-2 of the Statistical Tables for the
Federal Judiciar! published annually on 31st December by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts between 2009 and 2018. For example, in 2018, 526 out of
544 antitrust cases filed in federal district courts were private actions. STAT. TABLES
FOR FED. JUDICIARY, TABLE C-2. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS"CIVIL CASES COMMENCED,
BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2017 AND 2018, https://www.uscourts.gov/file/25840/download
[https://perma.cc/5MUN-MVAJ]. In comparison, among 30 European countries, only
53, 56 and 45 damages actions were judged for the first time in 2018, 2019 and 2020
respectively. Jean-Fran#ois Laborde, Cartel Damages Actions in Europe: How Courts
Have Assessed Cartel Overcharges, CONCURRENCES 232, 234-35 (2021).
52. STAT. TABLES FOR FED. JUDICIARY, supra note 51.
53. Penn World Table version 10.0 only provides total factor productivity data
starting from 1954. See infra Table 1.
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my results and performs a robustness check; Part IV discusses the
results; and part V briefly concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS
This study applies regression analysis54 to evaluate the impact of
private antitrust enforcement on GDP in the short run and long run. The
models I use for the two evaluations are different. Below, I introduce the
models and explain the choice of model.
1. Short Run Model
First, I address the impact of private antitrust enforcement on GDP
in the short run. To obtain an unbiased estimate, the major challenge is
endogeneity. On the one hand, there could be unobservable factors that
lead to private enforcement and that also affect GDP. On the other hand,
causation might not only occur in one direction. One may argue that
victims are more willing to file antitrust suits against wrongdoers in
years with a higher or lower GDP. This would be because victims and
lawyers have more income to spend on litigation in years with high GDP
(i.e., a high GDP causing more suits). Conversely, others could argue
that the economic condition is poor in years with low GDP. Then, in
these years, cartel members may be more likely to enter a dispute and
end up suing each other (i.e., a low GDP causing more suits). These
conflicting hypotheses suggest that private parties’ decisions to enforce
antitrust law could be endogenous.55 There are two methods by which
this problematic endogeneity can be corrected. First, researchers could
lag the suspected variables by one or more periods.56 This solution is
54. Regression analysis is a statistical method to study the relationship between the
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Regression analysis
produces a regression equation where the coefficients represent the relationship
between the dependent variable and each independent variable. GUJARATI & PORTER,
supra note 23, at 21-22 & 25.
55. Similarly, some scholars suggest that public antitrust enforcement is
endogenous. Joan-Ramon Borrell & Mara Tolosa, Endogenous Antitrust: CrossCountr! Evidence on the Impact of Competition-Enhancing Policies, 15 APPLIED ECON.
LETTERS 827, 827 (2008).
56. See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 17, at 607-11.
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based on the argument that even if current values of a variable X might
be endogenous to current values of variable Y, it is unlikely that past
values of X are subject to the same problem. However, as discussed,
private enforcement (which is X in this study) could not only have a
short-run but also a long-run impact on GDP (which is Y in this study). 57
If so, lagging the variable of private enforcement merely shows the
long-run effect, if any, but not the short-run effect. Therefore, the
lagging approach is not suitable for studying the short-run output effect.
The second group of solutions to the endogeneity problem is to use
an instrumental variable.58 This is the method this Article applies to deal
with the endogeneity of private antitrust enforcement. More precisely, I
use a dummy variable for two landmark antitrust decisions, both decided
in 1977, as an instrumental variable and run a two-stage least squares
regression (“2SLS regression”).59 The equation of the first-stage
regression is in the form
!!"!#"$ ! #0 ! #1 "$%"&"'(& ! #! ) ! $1

where Private is the number of private antitrust case filings60 and
Decisions is the instrumental variable!a dummy variable for the two
1977 decisions!which is always included in the regression;61 and X is a
subset of variables chosen from a pool of explanatory variables of
! , the estimated
GDP.62 From this first-stage regression, I obtain !!!!#"$
See discussions supra Part I.
An instrumental variable is a third variable (e.g., Z) used in regression analysis
to estimate the causal relationship between the dependent variable (e.g., Y) and
independent variable (e.g., X). See GUJARATI & PORTER, supra note 23, at 230
(explaining instrumental variables); Ma, supra note 17, at 315-17 (using an
instrumental variable to address endogeneity).
59. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is a specific type of regression analysis that
uses instrumental variables to handle models with endogeneity. As the name suggests,
2SLS regression consists of two stages. In the first stage, the variable of interest is
regressed on the instrumental variable and a set of independent variables. Then, the
predicted values (i.e., fitted values) of the variable of interest could be obtained. In the
second stage, the dependent variable is regressed on the predicted values of the variable
of interest, and the same set of independent variables used in the first stage. GUJARATI
& PORTER, supra note 23, at 362-66.
60. See discussion infra Section II.D.
61. Id.
62. See discussion infra Section II.C.
57.
58.
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! to run secondvalues of !!"!#"$. Then, I use fitted values of !!!!#"$
stage regression in the form
! ! %! ) ! $2
#"! ! %0 ! %1 !!!!#"$

! is the variable of
where GDP is per capita real GDP,63 !!!!#"$
interest and is always included in the regression, and X is the same
subset of explanatory variables of GDP mentioned above. Although I
describe the two stages of regression separately, I regress the two stages
simultaneously with a statistical tool to avoid getting incorrectly small
standard errors. In the following parts, I will explain all the variables
and data used for my 2SLS regression in more detail. It is important to
note that I have transformed the dependent variable, the variable of
interest, and most explanatory variables into (natural) logarithmic
form.64 This means that I am adopting a log-log model. The advantage
of doing so is that the interpretation of the regression coefficients is
straightforward. For instance, the %1 coefficient would be interpreted as
! is associated with a %1 percent
“a one percent increase in !!!!#"$
65
increase in #"!.”
2. Long Run Model

In contrast, there is no need for concern about the endogeneity
problem when studying the impact of private antitrust enforcement on
GDP in the long run. This is because, conceptually, there is no reason
for us to believe that the current GDP affects the intensity of private
enforcement in the past. Thus, a 2SLS regression is not required to study
the long-run effect. Instead, I apply ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression.66 The long run model here uses the equation of the form

See discussion infra Section II.B.
The two commonly used bases for logarithmic transformation are 10 (i.e.,
common logarithms) and the mathematical number e (i.e. natural logarithms). There is a
fixed relationship between the common log and natural log, so it does not matter which
one is used. In economics, natural logs are usually preferred. Thus, I use the base e for
all log transformation in this article. GUJARATI & PORTER, supra note 23, at 175-76.
65. Id. at 133-34.
66. OLS regression is a commonly used method to estimate the relationship
between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables by minimizing the
sum of the squared residuals. GUJARATI & PORTER, supra note 23, at 33-36.
63.
64.
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#"! ! &0 ! &1 !!!"!#"$ $#**$+" ! &! ) ! $3

where GDP is still per capita real GDP of the current year, X is the
same subset of explanatory variables of GDP mentioned before, also of
the current year, and !!"!#"$ $#**$+ is a subset of three variables of
interest. The three variables refer to the number of private antitrust case
filings in the past. One of the three variables of interest is always
included in the regression.67 Like in my short run model, I use logs for
variables on both sides of the econometric specification of my long run
model. Therefore, the coefficient &1 is the estimated percent change in
#"! for a 1 percent change in !!"!#"$ $#**$+.68
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Previous studies of the effect of antitrust on growth have generally
used the level69 or growth rate of per capita real GDP as the dependent
variable.70 For both the short run and long run models, I use level per
capita real GDP from 1954 to 2019 (in log form) as the outcome
variable to evaluate the output effect of private antitrust cases filed in
the United States. Data on real GDP and the population of the United
States for the period were extracted from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis71 and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,72 respectively.

See discussion infra Section II.D.
GUJARATI & PORTER, supra note 23, at 133-34.
See Taylor, supra note 45, at 6.
Gutmann & Voigt, supra note 24.
BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, TABLE 1.1.6. REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT,
CHAINED DOLLARS, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2&isuri=
1&1921=survey#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&1921=survey
[https://perma.cc/VJ9BY3YV].
72. Population, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
B230RC0A052NBEA [https://perma.cc/2QMR-R4B4] (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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TABLE 1!VARIABLES, SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
VARIABLE

SOURCE

DEFINITION

Population

Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis

Total population (in log form).73

Human
Capital Index

Penn World Table
(version 10.0)

An index based on years of schooling and
returns to education.74

Capital Stock

Penn World Table
(version 10.0)

Capital stock in constant dollars (in log
form).75

Total Factor
Productivity

Penn World Table
(version 10.0)

Total factor productivity in constant
dollars.76
Gross domestic product per

GDP/Capita
(lagged 1 yr.)

U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis
Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis

Openness
Index

U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis

Sum of exports and imports in chained
dollars measured as a share of real GDP.78

Real Gov.
Expenses

U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis

Government consumption expenditures
and gross investment in chained dollars
(in log form).79

Real Unit
Labor Cost

U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics

Labor costs per unit of output of the
business sector in constant dollars (in log
form).80

capita in constant dollars one year before
(in log form).77

73.
74.

FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, supra note 72.
Penn World Table Version 10.0, UNIV. GRONINGEN, https://www.
rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/9PCV-4GE4] (last updated
June 18, 2021).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 71; FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, supra
note 72.
78. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 71.
79. Id.
80. Calculated by
!%''!,( &'-.$(&#""'(" " !%''!& /'!0$+" "

2012 !!"%$ "$1,#"'!
1
"
&'!!$(" !!"%$ "$1,#"'! ''".'"

using annual level data. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
MEASURES
FOR
BUSINESS
AND
NONFARM
BUSINESS
https://www.bls.gov/lpc/#tables [https://perma.cc/RD8G-V3QJ].

COSTS
SECTORS,

AND
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VARIABLE
Real Unit
Total Cost
Public
Enforcement

Real Money
Supply
Expected
Inflation

81.

SOURCE

491

DEFINITION

U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics

Labor and nonlabor costs per unit of
output of the business sector in constant
dollars (in log form).81

U.S. Courts

Number of antitrust cases filed by the
government in district courts (in log
form).82

Federal Reserve
System
U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics
University of
Michigan

M2 money stock in constant dollars (in
log form).83
Consumers’ expected changes in inflation
rates next year.84

Calculated by

!%''!,( &'-.$(&#""'(" " !%''!& /'!0$+" "

2012 !!"%$ "$1,#"'!
1
1
"
"
&'!!$(" !!"%$ "$1,#"'! ''".'" $#2'! (ℎ#!$

using annual level data. Id.
82. Data from 1954 to 1992 were obtained from Annual Report of the Director
published by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on various issues between
1954 and 1992. Data from 1993 to 2008 were obtained from Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics published by the U.S. Courts on various issues between 1993 and 2008. Data
from 2009 to 2017 were obtained from Judicial Business of the United States Courts
published by the U.S. Courts on various issues between 2009 and 2017.
83. I use consumer price index for all urban consumers (current series) to convert
nominal money supply to 2012 constant dollar. Data Download Program, FED. RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Download.aspx?rel=H6&series=de0d7f9
3074e32cae3e619735d9cc5ce&filetype=spreadsheetml&label=include&layout=seriesc
olumn&from=01/01/1959&to=01/31/2020 [https://perma.cc/NY7G-JKSS] (last visited
Feb. 12, 2020); U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) DATABASES,
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm [https://perma.cc/KWK8-NPKX] (last visited Feb. 12,
2020).
84. UNIV. MICH. SURV. CONSUMER, EXPECTED CHANGES IN INFLATION RATES,
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/files/tbcpx1px5.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLF3-QMFY].
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C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Table 1 presents the subset of independent variables I use for the
2SLS regression and provides their sources and definitions. Below, I
explain why I control for these variables.
P!"#!a$i!%, H#&a% Ca"i$a! I%de', Ca"i$a! S$!c", & T!$a! Fac$!(
P(!d#c$i)i$*. These variables are the backbone of my regression model.
I include them in the model because leading economic theories suggest
that the growth of economies is driven by the aggregate of capital stock,
labor, and productivity.85 I control for population rather than the number
of people employed. This is because the former affects not only the
supply of labor but also the demand for goods and services. Human
Capital Inde" is included to reflect the productivity of labor, while Total
Factor Productivit! is included to control the state of technology, which
explains the portion of growth not explained by changes in labor and
capital used in production.
Rea! GDP/Ca"i$a (!a##ed 1 *(.). This refers to the real GDP per
capita in the United States for the period from 1953 to 2018. Recall that
the output variable is real GDP per capita from 1954 to 2019. Thus, the
model regresses the current output on the output one year ago. This
controls the effect of output today on output one year ahead. If the
country had a high GDP per capita in a given year, it would probably
have a similarly high GDP per capita in the following year.
O"e%%e++ I%de'. Previous empirical studies suggest that trade
openness affects antitrust policy86 and economic growth; consequently,
they control for an openness index.87 I do the same to capture the impact
of the degree of the openness of the United States to the world trade
system over the years.
Rea! G!). E'"e%+e+ & Rea! M!%e* S#""!* & Rea! G!). These
variables are used to capture the effect of government interventions on
growth. Real Gov. E"penses is included as a proxy to control for the
impact of fascial policies, while Real Mone! Suppl! is added to the
model to control for the impact of monetary policies. It is noteworthy
that the Federal Reserve only provides money supply data since 1959, so

85. PHILIPPE AGHION & PETER HOWITT, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY Ch. 1-3
(1998).
86. Petersen, supra note 17, at 613.
87. Dutz & Hayri, supra note 17, at 6; Clougherty, supra note 17, at 120.
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employing such data would cost 8 percent of observations.88 Thus, I did
not give priority to this variable when adding controls to the regression
models.
Ti&e. This variable is not listed in Table 1, as it is simply a selfcreated variable to control for the time trend on growth, if any, and does
not have a source. For Time, I code 1 for the first year (1954), 2 for the
second year (1955), etc.
Rea! U%i$ Lab!( C!+$ & Rea! U%i$ T!$a! C!+$. Either one of these
variables is included to control for the cost of production, which affects
the aggregate supply in the economy. These costs are calculated using
the data of the U.S. business sector because the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics does not publish productivity measures for the total
economy.89 The business sector data is the best alternative because it is
the broadest measure of productivity the Bureau publishes, and it
accounts for approximately 75 percent of the nation’s GDP. 90
P#b!ic E%$!(ce&e%$. Like private enforcement, antitrust cases filed
in court by antitrust authorities should have an impact on GDP.
Therefore, I control for it. I do not consider Public Enforcement as the
variable of interest, and it is always included it in the model because I
could not find a suitable instrumental variable to cope with the
endogeneity problem associated with public actions.91 In any event, in
the case of the United States, the impact of public enforcement should
be far less significant than the impact of private enforcement, as merely
3 percent of total antitrust cases filed in the country in the last decade
were public enforcement actions.92
E'"ec$ed I%$!a$i!%. This variable is used to capture people’s
perception of future economic conditions. Expected inflation is a critical
indicator, since it affects both aggregate demand and aggregate supply.
On the one hand, when people expect inflation to increase, their demand
for money decreases.93 Holding all else equal, this causes the real
interest rate to fall. Consequently, firms are more eager to invest and

88.
89.

FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 83.
Labor Productivit! and Cost - Frequentl! Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/lpc/faqs.htm#P08 [https://perma.cc/24R4XACU] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
90. Id.
91. See discussions supra Section II.A.
92. STAT. TABLES FOR FED. JUDICIARY, supra note 51.
93. ANDREW B. ABEL ET AL., MACROECONOMICS 327, 346 (8th ed. 2014).
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aggregate demand rises.94 On the other hand, when firms expect goods
and services to sell at a higher price in the future, they will be less
willing to sell now.95 Thus, an increase in expectations for inflation
causes the short-run aggregate supply to drop.96 The University of
Michigan publishes Surve!s of Consumers that reports consumers’
expected change in the inflation rate for the next year.97 However, the
survey data do not cover years 1954 to 1965 and 1977,98 so employing
the survey data would cost 20 percent of observations. In light of this
limitation, I did not give priority to this variable while adding controls to
the regression models.
D. VARIABLE OF INTEREST & INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE
The variables of interest of the short run model and the long run model
are different. In the short run model, the variable of interest is Private,
the number of private antitrust cases filed to the District Courts in the
United States for the period from 1954 to 2019. Such data are acquired
from multiple sources. To offer a more holistic view of the changes in
private antitrust case filings over time, I prepared Figure 1, which covers
the filing numbers from 1890, when the country passed its first antitrust
law, the Sherman Act,99 to 2019.100 Note that, similar to some of the
94.
95.

Id.
Sellers# E"pectations, Suppl! Determinant, AMOSWEB, http://www.
amosweb.com/cgi-bin/awb_nav.pl?s=wpd&c=dsp&k=sellers%27+expectations,+
supply+determinant [https://perma.cc/MGC5-KK5T] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
96. Id.
97. UNIV. MICH. SURV. CONSUMER, supra note 84.
98. Id.
99. An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and
Monopolies, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. $$ 1-7)
[hereinafter Sherman Act].
100. All data presented in this figure, except for those between 1890 and 1936, are
the actual number of private antitrust cases filed. Data from 1890 to 1936 were
estimates of cases filed based on the actual number of cases decided in each year,
obtained from records of the 89th U.S. Congress Hearings. Nolo Contendere and
Private Antitrust Enforcement: Hearings on S. 2512 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
& Monopol! of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciar!, 89th Cong. 180-99 (1966). These
estimates are the product of actual case numbers and multipliers suggested by Hon.
Richard A. Posner in his empirical study. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Stud! of
Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 371 (1970). Data from 1937 to 1940 and
from 1944 to 1992 were obtained from the Annual Report of the Director published by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on various issues between 1940 and 1992.
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other variables, the filing numbers are transformed to log form for the
regression analysis.

FIGURE 1
Data from 1941 to 1943 were obtained from records of the 89th U.S. Congress
Hearings. Nolo Contendere and Private Antitrust Enforcement: Hearings on S. 2512
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopol! of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciar!,
89th Cong. 159 (1966). Data from 1993 to 2019 were obtained from the Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics published by the U.S. Courts on various issues between
1993 and 2019. Note that in 1960, the U.S. government brought an antitrust case
against 29 companies that supplied electrical equipment. Then, from 1962 to 1967,
more than one thousand and nine hundred private individuals separately filed followedon suits against those companies. These private electrical equipment cases are not
included in our figure because no other cartel before or after has generated a
comparable level of private actions. Similar cases thereafter have been consolidated,
and plaintiffs would be grouped. See Paul E. Godek, Does the Tail Wag the Dog? Si"t!
Years of Government and Private Antitrust in the Federal Courts, 9 ANTITRUST SOURCE
1, 1-2 (2009) (showing an example of a similar chart that reported electrical equipment
cases separately for these reasons). In a 2012 publication, a similar chart was presented
to show the private antitrust case filings from 1950 to 2011. In that chart, these
electrical equipment cases were also excluded. Otherwise, the filing numbers from 1962
through 1967 reported in that chart would be higher. See William Kolasky, Antitrust
Litigation: What#s Changed in Twent!-Five Years?, 27 ANTITRUST 1, 9 (2012)
(showing a similar figure published in 2012). Further, when the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts publish the antitrust case filing statistics in the 1960s, they also
report “Antitrust electrical equipment” separately from all other antitrust cases (i.e.,
“Antitrust other”).
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As explained, I introduce an instrumental variable and run a 2SLS
regression to address the endogeneity of private antitrust enforcement.101
The sole instrumental variable I use is a dummy variable created for two
landmark antitrust decisions made by the Supreme Court in 1977:
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat102 and Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois.103 Both Supreme Court decisions have not been overruled and
are still good law, so I created the Decisions variable and coded one for
all the years on or after 1977, and zero otherwise.
In January 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brunswick, a
classic antitrust case challenging the acquisition of bowling alleys.
Brunswick Corp., a bowling equipment manufacturer, was acquiring and
operating bankrupt bowling alleys.104 Several owners of still-operating
bowling alleys sued, arguing that they would have earned more profits if
Brunswick had not acquired the bankrupt alleys, because they would
have left the market and stopped competing with the small bowling
alleys.105 Thus, plaintiffs claimed, Brunswick’s act had substantially
lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly, violating Section 7
of the Clayton Act.106 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and
established the requirement that the injury asserted by plaintiffs in
private actions must result from the anti-competitive effect of the
defendant’s conduct, but not flow from competition created by the
defendant.107 This is known as “antitrust injury.”108 The antitrust injury
requirement has created an obstacle to private enforcement.109
In June of that same year, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick,
where some concrete block producers were accused of conspiring to sell
blocks at a marked-up price to wholesalers (direct purchasers).110 The
state of Illinois and hundreds of local governmental entities bought
blocks from these wholesalers.111 The government sued the concrete
See supra Section II.A.
429 U.S. 477 (1977).
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 479.
Id.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 489; ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW
NUTSHELL 546 (5th ed. 2004).
109. Id. See Baker, supra note 33, at 42.
110. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1977).
111. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

AND

ECONOMICS

IN A
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block producers for damages under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
claiming that it had suffered harm from the alleged price-fixing scheme
because the wholesalers passed some of the illegal overcharges along to
the government (i.e., indirect purchasers) by increasing the wholesale
price.112 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant producers
and held that indirect purchasers have no standing to sue for antitrust
violations, meaning only direct purchasers could sue under federal
antitrust law.113 The creation of the “direct purchaser” rule removed
many victims’ right to bring antitrust lawsuits and reduced the number
of private antitrust actions.114
Both 1977 decisions limit private parties’ ability to file antitrust
lawsuits and suppressed private antitrust enforcement thereafter. The
private antitrust case filing numbers were at a historic high of 1,611
counts in the year Brunswick and Illinois Brick were decided.115 After
the two decisions, the number of filings dropped rapidly, and it has
never climbed back anywhere close to the 1977 peak.116
The result of a 2SLS regression is only as good as the instrumental
variable used. A valid instrumental variable must satisfy three
assumptions, namely the relevance assumption, the independence
assumption (also known as exchangeability assumption), and the
exclusion restriction.117 I argue that Decisions is a suitable instrumental
variable because it largely meets the three assumptions.

112.
113.

Id.
Michael D. Hausfeld et al., Litigating Indirect Purchaser Claims: Lessons for
the EU from the U.S. E"perience, 32 ANTITRUST 58, 59 (2018).
114. See Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquir! into the Efficienc! of
Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independentl! Initiated Cases
Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1179 (1986) (suggesting that the Illinois Brick decision
has caused the number of private antitrust actions to drop after 1978).
115. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 318 (1977),
https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/administrative-office-united-statescourts-annual-report-director-1 [https://perma.cc/8LTV-SHUN]. See Sinchit Lai,
Enabling and Incentivi$ing Standalone Private Antitrust Actions in Hong Kong%
Lessons from the United States, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 463, 495 (2019) (explaining the
rising trend of private antitrust enforcement started from 1938).
116. See supra Figure 1.
117. Jeremy Labrecque & Sonja A. Swanson, Understanding the Assumptions
Underl!ing Instrumental Variable Anal!ses: A Brief Review of Falsification Strategies
and Related Tools, 5 CURRENT EPIDEMIOLOGY REPS. 214, 214 (2018).
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The relevance assumption requires an instrument to be significantly
related to the treatment.118 In our case, this means the two 1977 Supreme
Court decisions (Decision) had to be significantly related to the private
antitrust case filing numbers (Private). To verify this, I ran the firststage regression and present the results in Table 2. The results show that
the coefficient on the instrumental variable Decisions has the predicted
sign (negative).119 More importantly, the Decisions variable is
significantly correlated with the endogenous variable Private.120
The exclusion restriction and independence assumption present
unique problems in verification because, unlike the relevance
assumption, neither could rely on a formal statistical test for validity.121
The independence assumption holds if the instrumental variable
(Decision) does not share a common cause with the outcome variable
(GDP).122 Meanwhile exclusion restriction holds if an instrument
variable (Decision) affects the outcome (GDP) only through the
treatment (Private).123 Because neither assumption can be verified
through formal analysis, it is imperative that an analysis is undertaken
based on subject matter knowledge.124
Starting with the independence assumption, adopting the 1977
decisions as an instrumental variable likely satisfies this assumption
because the timing and outcome of the decisions are somewhat random.
Generally, court decisions are preceded by underlying incidents and
controversies, which could occur at any time. The courts have no control
over when, where, or how potentially violative conduct arises; nor do
they have control over whether those harmed ultimately bring suit.
Further, the Supreme Court receives 7,000 petitions for a hearing on
average annually, but it only agrees to hear 100 to 150 of them (a

See id. at 215.
See supra Table 2.
Id.
Mette Lise Lousadal, An Introduction to Instrumental Variable Assumptions,
Validation and Estimation, 15 EMERG. THEMES EPIDEMIOL 1, 4-5 (2018).
122. Jeremy Labrecque & Sonja A. Swanson, Understanding the Assumptions
Underl!ing Instrumental Variable Anal!ses: A Brief Review of Falsification Strategies
and Related Tools, 5 CURRENT EPIDEMIOLOGY REPS. 214, 215 (2018).
123. Id. at 216.
124. Lousadal, supra note 121.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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success rate of some 2 percent).125 William Rehnquist, one of the
Associate Justices who decided the two 1977 cases,126 commented that
whether or not a case is accepted by the Supreme Court is “a rather
subjective decision, made up in part of intuition and in part of legal
judgment.”127 Regarding antitrust in particular, the vagueness and
breadth of federal competition statutes are such that the Court has relied
less on statutory interpretation and more on the common law process to
develop the law.128 Therefore, case outcomes depend heavily on, inter
alia, the time and composition of the Court when the case is heard. This
means that a case could result oppositely if it was heard in a different
year or by a different group of justices. For instance, the decision in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois was not unanimous.129 And some
jurisdictions, such as the European Union, do have a rule different from
the United States that allows indirect purchasers to sue for damages.130
Turning to the exclusion restriction, to understand why the two
1977 decisions likely satisfy this assumption and serve as a valid
instrumental variable, one may consider an example of an invalid
instrument, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombl!.131 Twombl! is a 2007
landmark civil procedure and antitrust case, where one of the key
allegations was that several large telecommunication companies
engaged in parallel conduct to hinder the growth of their smaller
competitors.132 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for
failing to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
125. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/aboutfederal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activityresources/supreme-1 [https://perma.cc/5DTF-WV9E] (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
126. William Rehnquist served on the U.S. Supreme Court for 33 years, first as an
Associate Justice from 1972 to 1986 and then as a Chief Justice from 1986 to 2005.
Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/T7XZ-GWE2] (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
127. Choosing Cases, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/longterm/supcourt/history/choosing.htm [https://perma.cc/9N7V-5TNW]
(last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
128. Rebecca Allensworth, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Wh! Antitrust
Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011).
129. This was a 6-3 decision. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 720-23 (1977).
130. Hausfeld et al., supra note 113, at 58.
131. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
132. Thomas P. Gressette Jr., The Heightened Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase in American Legal Histor!
Begins, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 418 (2010).
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Procedure (FRCP).133 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
defendants, clarifying the pleading requirements under FRCP Rule
8(a)(2), and holding that alleging parallel conduct alone is insufficient to
prove a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.134 Instead, a
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”135 As such, Twombl! heightened the pleading
requirements that had been set forth by the same court in Conle! v.
Gibson in 1957.136 Since cartels are normally conducted secretly and
critical evidence is controlled by the cartels, Twombl! is unduly harsh on
plaintiffs who can struggle to meet the pleading standard.137 It is no
wonder Twombl! has discouraged victims from filing antitrust actions.
As shown in Figure 1, private antitrust case filing numbers increased
from the early 1990s to 2007, the year Twombl! was decided, and then,
in subsequent years, the numbers dropped sharply.138 Thus, Twombl! is
likely to satisfy the instrument relevance assumption but, as discussed
below, it cannot satisfy the exclusion restriction.
This inability to act as the exclusion restriction is because
Twombly’s impact extends beyond the field of antitrust: the decision
changed the pleading standard for dismissal under the FRCP, affecting
all types of federal civil actions.139 As such, the chilling effect of
Twombl! applies not only to antitrust lawsuits, but also to all other
federal civil actions. This means Twombl! could influence GDP through
channels other than the private antitrust case filing numbers (Private).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.
Id.; Twombl!, 550 U.S. at 570.
Gressette Jr., supra note 132, at 420. In Conle!, the Court set forth that “a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
137. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST 156 (2017).
138. Supra Figure 1, supra note 100.
139. In the two years following Twombl!, there were vigorous disagreements about
whether its plausibility standard applied to all types of federal actions (i.e., not just
antitrust cases). That said, in those two years, “the courts generally assumed a more
restricted application.” The discussion was halted when the Supreme Court confirmed
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal the applicability of the heightened pleading standard in nonantitrust cases. Twombly & Iqbal & The New Federal Pleading Standard Plaintiffs#
Attorne!s Must Stop and Take Notice Of, TRIAL REP. (Dec. 7, 2010),
https://www.hcinjurylaw.com/twombly-iqbal-new-federal/
[https://perma.cc/L3Q6CUCZ]. See generall! Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
133.
134.
135.
136.
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For instance, the harsher pleading requirements might discourage
victims from bringing employment discrimination lawsuits, adversely
affecting GDP by reducing labor market efficiency). Therefore, because
Twombl! affects the outcome GDP not only through the treatment
Private, Twombl! violates the exclusion restriction and cannot serve as a
valid instrument for the 2SLS regression analysis.
In contrast, the instrument selected for this Study!the 1977
Supreme Court decisions!does not suffer from the same problem. The
1977 Supreme Court decisions satisfy exclusion restriction because they
only changed antitrust law, more specifically, they only changed the rule
in relation to private antitrust enforcement. Conceptually, the sole
channel through which the 1977 decisions (Decisions) could influence
GDP is by affecting the number of private antitrust enforcement actions
(Private). Therefore, the 1977 decisions satisfy exclusion restriction
along with the other two assumptions, and can serve as a valid
instrument for the short-run regression model.
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After reviewing the variable of interest and instrumental variable of
the short run model, I now turn to explain the subset of variable of
interest of the long run model!Private Lagged.140 Under the set, there
are three variables:
P(i)a$e E%$!(ce&e%$ La##ed 3 Yea(+. This refers to the number of
private antitrust cases filed to the U.S. district courts for the period from
1951 to 2016 (instead of 1954 to 2019). Recall that the output variable is
level per capita real GDP from 1954 to 2019. Thus, the model regresses
the current output on the private enforcement 3 years ago. This analyzes
the effect of private enforcement today on output 3 years later.
P(i)a$e E%$!(ce&e%$ La##ed 6 Yea(+. Similarly, this variable of
interest is obtained by lagging Private. The sole difference between this
variable and the previous variable is that the former is lagged 6 years,
while the latter is lagged 3 years. This means that the current variable
incorporates the number of private antitrust cases filed in the United
States for the period from 1948 to 2013. The current variable is created
to study the effect of private enforcement today on output 6 years later.
P(i)a$e E%$!(ce&e%$ La##ed 9 Yea(+. This variable refers to the
number of private antitrust cases filed in the U.S. district courts for the
period from 1945 to 2010 (lagged 9 years). It is employed to analyze the
effect of private enforcement today on output 9 years ahead.
The data source of these three variables of interest is the same as
that of Private.141 As explained, there is no endogeneity of private
enforcement in the long run, so a 2SLS regression is not required to
analyze the long-run output effect. Instead, I applied OLS regression; 142
therefore, the long-run model has no instrumental variable. Only one of
the three variables of interest appears in the regression each time. In
other words, I ran three OLS regressions to examine the 3-year, 6-year,
and 9-year output effects separately. Comparing the results of these
three regressions allows for an evaluation of how long-lasting the effect
of private enforcement is on output, if there is any effect.

See Section II.A.2.
See supra Figure 1; supra note 100.
See GUJARATI & PORTER, supra note 23, at 33-36 (explaining the OLS
regression method).
140.
141.
142.
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III. RESULTS & ROBUSTNESS CHECK
A. RESULTS
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the explanatory
variables used in the analyses before log transformation. In bivariate
analysis, a statistical analysis of two variables to determine the
relationship between them, the dependent variable real GDP per capita
is weakly and positively correlated with the number of private antitrust
case filings in the current year, lagged 3 years, lagged 6 years, and
lagged 9 years (Pearson coefficients 0.14, 0.26, 0.34, and 0.46,
respectively).
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TABLE 3! DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON VARIABLES BEFORE LOG TRANSFORMATION
VARIABLES

MEAN

SD

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

OBSERVATIONS

35,468

12,781

16,504

58,113

66

Actual Private
Enforcement
(counts)

757.14

370.83

163

1,611

66

Private Enforcement
lagged 3 yrs.
(counts)

741.48

385.46

16

1,611

66

Private Enforcement
lagged 6 yrs.
(counts)

709.80

403.54

78

1,611

66

Private Enforcement
lagged 9 yrs.
(counts)

684.65

425.53

27

1,611

66

Population
(millions)

246.40

49.38

162.39

328.53

66

3.32

0.35

2.63

3.75

66

Capital Stock
(millions)

37,187,081

17,849,101

12,073,594

69,059,072

66

Total Factor
Productivity

0.84

0.10

0.65

1.02

66

34,844

12,664

16,504

57,006

66

0.17

0.09

0.06

0.32

66

2,145,194

755,272

971,608

3,307,322

66

Real Unit Labor
Cost (dollars)

74.71

3.18

67.93

79.29

66

Real Unit Total Cost
(dollars)

121.89

0.068

121.60

121.99

66

Public Enforcement
(counts)

28.88

13.62

9

73

66

Real Money Supply
(billions)

6,255

2,903

2,345

13,831

61

Expected Inflation
(%)

3.61

1.59

2.10

9.70

53

D"#"$%"$& Va'(a)*"+:
Real GDP/Capital
(millions)
E,#*a$a&-'.
Va'(a)*"+:

Human Capital
Index

Real GPD/Capita of
last year (millions)
Openness Index
Real Government
Expenses (millions)

506

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

Table 4 reports the 2SLS regression results of the impact of private
enforcement on real GDP per capita in the short run. The results are
reasonably consistent with existing growth theories and my
expectations, as the coefficients on all independent variables, except for
openness index, government expenses, and labor cost, have the
predicted sign. The three variables that do not have the predicted sign
are not worrying because they do not always have statistical significance
across the 10 models under Table 4. The regression analysis reverses the
positive correlations observed in the bivariate analysis. The associations
achieve statistical significance on the . # 0.1, . # 0.05 or . # 0.01
levels.143 Thus, 1 percent increases in private enforcement are associated
with approximately 0.0389 to 0.138 percent decreases in real GDP per
capita.
Next, it is important to look at the OLS regression results of the
impact of private enforcement on real GDP per capita in the long run.
Tables 5 and 6 show that private enforcement has a negative effect on
real GDP per capita 3 and 6 years ahead, respectively. Again, the results
reverse the positive correlations observed in the bivariate analysis and
are statistically significant on the . # 0.1, . # 0.05, or . # 0.01 levels.
One percent increase in private enforcement is associated with
approximately 0.0284 to 0.0362 percent decrease in real GDP per capita
3 years later, and 0.0178 to 0.0280 percent decrease 6 years later.
The situation is different for the effect of private enforcement on
real GDP per capita in the very long run. Table 7 reveals that private
enforcement lagged 9 years also has a negative effect on output.
However, the associations do not achieve statistical significance in
almost all the 10 models under Table 7. This means that the negative
effect recorded is likely to have occurred by chance only, hence the
impact private enforcement has on real GDP per capita in the long run is
undetermined
143. Statistical significance helps to measure whether a finding is likely due to
chance or to some factor of interest, hence determine the meaningfulness of the
research finding. A statistically significant finding is likely due to the factor of interest
rather than by chance, hence is meaningful, and vice versa. GUJARATI & PORTER, supra
note 23, at 503-07. To test statistical significance, there are three commonly used pvalue thresholds: 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. They correspond to a confidence interval of 90%,
95% and 99% respectively. The lower the p-value thresholds, the harder is to show
statistical significance. Thus, when an association achieves statistical significance at a
lower p-value threshold (e.g., p<0.01), the stronger is the evidence that the association
was not obtained at random. Id. at 75-76.

(0.293)
0.607***

(0.235)
0.166
(0.268)
1.363***
(0.288)

(0.215)
0.255

(0.216)
1.053***
(0.166)
1.352***
(0.299)

Population

66
0.998

(2.476)

(2.242)

66
0.998

5.628**

0.815

66
0.998

(2.473)

5.535**

-0.322
(0.245)

0.581***
(0.157)

(0.233)
0.0364
(0.309)
1.472***
(0.314)

(0.378)
0.602***

(0.0259)
-0.828**

-0.0667**

(3)

(1.875)

-0.598

-0.0104***
(0.00370)

-0.241**
(0.106)

-0.333
(0.302)

0.621***
(0.141)

(0.227)
0.510**
(0.251)
1.670***
(0.375)

(0.372)
0.415*

(0.0300)
-0.483

-0.0756**

(5)

(1.950)

0.0280

-0.00917**
(0.00456)
0.114
(0.192)

-0.221*
(0.117)

-0.275
(0.320)

0.567***
(0.174)

(0.213)
0.471*
(0.251)
1.754***
(0.344)

(0.417)
0.474**

(0.0287)
-0.573

-0.0764***

MODELS
(6)

66
66
66
0.998
0.998
0.998
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2.343)

3.646

-0.0973
(0.0817)

-0.520
(0.341)

0.606***
(0.140)

(0.226)
0.268
(0.260)
1.456***
(0.322)

(0.322)
0.405*

(0.0234)
-0.888***

-0.0568**

(4)

66
0.998

(22.10)

26.27

-5.716
(4.616)

-0.0105***
(0.00351)

-0.229**
(0.105)

-0.299
(0.290)

0.598***
(0.135)

(0.225)
0.575**
(0.251)
1.601***
(0.361)

(0.361)
0.377*

(0.0286)
-0.543

-0.0710**

(7)

66
0.998

(22.71)

26.46

-5.757
(4.755)
0.00252
(0.00645)

-0.0104***
(0.00351)

-0.232**
(0.106)

-0.306
(0.293)

0.589***
(0.137)

(0.225)
0.600**
(0.258)
1.622***
(0.365)

(0.366)
0.381*

(0.0288)
-0.603

-0.0728**

(8)

61
0.997

(30.94)

53
0.993

(37.59)

(0.00450)
42.01

(0.137)
0.00292

(0.113)

22.20

-12.51
(8.176)
0.00143
(0.0130)
0.235*

-0.0397**
(0.0178)

-0.557***
(0.213)

-0.568
(0.710)

0.558**
(0.270)

(0.410)
1.171*
(0.644)
1.129***
(0.406)

(1.873)
-0.00388

(0.0410)
1.802

-0.138***

(10)

-5.470
(6.274)
-0.00415
(0.00892)
0.117

-0.0198
(0.0132)

-0.270
(0.167)

0.167
(0.490)

0.702***
(0.175)

(0.301)
0.589*
(0.308)
1.225***
(0.316)

(0.809)
0.471

(0.0533)
-0.255

-0.0970*

(9)
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No. of Observations
R-squared

Constant

Expected Inflation

Real Money Supply

Public Enforcement

Real Unit Total Cost

Real Unit Labor Cost

Time

Real Gov. Expenses

Openness Index

GDP/Capita (lagged 1 yr.)

Total Factor Productivity

Capital Stock

0.495***
(0.149)

(0.0243)
-1.097***

Human Capital Index

-0.0590**

(0.0213)
-1.888***

(2)

-0.0389*

(1)

Private Enforcement

VARIABLES

TABLE 4!U.S. OUTPUT REGRESSIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL GDP PER CAPITA IN LOG FORM)
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-0.391
(0.871)

66
0.998

Constant

No. of Observations
R-squared

-0.0362***
(0.00969)
-2.012***
(0.210)
0.190*
(0.0987)
1.182***
(0.0845)
1.169***
(0.153)

(1)

66
0.999

1.127
(0.870)

-0.0294***
(0.00829)
-1.333***
(0.309)
0.235***
(0.0867)
0.654***
(0.175)
0.956***
(0.173)
0.374***
(0.103)

(2)

66
0.999

1.234
(1.106)

-0.0297***
(0.00886)
-1.362***
(0.374)
0.246**
(0.111)
0.659***
(0.180)
0.956***
(0.174)
0.366***
(0.114)
0.0308
(0.179)

(3)

-0.380
(1.453)

(6)

1.965
(1.979)

-0.0321***
(0.00912)
-1.702***
(0.474)
0.360**
(0.175)
0.697***
(0.205)
1.313***
(0.253)
0.188
(0.149)
0.125
(0.268)
-0.0146
(0.0659)
0.00298
(0.00300)
0.410*
(0.212)

MODELS

-0.0299***
(0.00872)
-1.333***
(0.415)
0.148
(0.114)
0.824***
(0.191)
1.025***
(0.202)
0.392***
(0.109)
-0.0922
(0.252)
-0.0912*
(0.0538)
-0.00168
(0.00240)

(5)

66
66
66
0.999
0.999
0.999
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.634
(1.219)

-0.0308***
(0.00871)
-1.404***
(0.369)
0.180
(0.124)
0.762***
(0.204)
1.035***
(0.198)
0.394***
(0.105)
-0.140
(0.214)
-0.0714
(0.0546)

(4)

66
0.999

21.62
(16.76)

-4.683
(3.604)

-0.0284***
(0.00862)
-1.339***
(0.410)
0.130
(0.120)
0.862***
(0.208)
1.000***
(0.204)
0.385***
(0.114)
-0.0762
(0.271)
-0.0891
(0.0594)
-0.00225
(0.00271)

(7)

66
0.999

21.89
(16.72)

-4.749
(3.601)
0.00541
(0.00605)

-0.0294***
(0.00856)
-1.503***
(0.426)
0.120
(0.123)
0.933***
(0.218)
1.008***
(0.203)
0.355***
(0.112)
-0.0798
(0.266)
-0.0868
(0.0589)
-0.00162
(0.00267)

(8)

61
0.998

20.13
(16.67)

-3.799
(3.473)
0.00308
(0.00618)
-0.0236
(0.0390)

-0.0297***
(0.0107)
-1.656**
(0.642)
0.217
(0.156)
0.727***
(0.243)
0.989***
(0.266)
0.437***
(0.115)
0.0336
(0.375)
-0.0505
(0.0634)
0.00162
(0.00455)

(9)

53
0.998

-2.681
(3.334)
0.00397
(0.00664)
-0.104**
(0.0430)
-0.00545*
(0.00313)
21.10
(15.21)

-0.0193
(0.0123)
-2.988***
(0.934)
0.275
(0.336)
0.775
(0.470)
1.054***
(0.293)
0.552***
(0.194)
0.457
(0.409)
-0.124
(0.0993)
0.0114**
(0.00523)

(10)
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Expected Inflation

Real Money Supply

Public Enforcement

Real Unit Total Cost

Real Unit Labor Cost

Time

Real Gov. Expenses

Openness Index

GDP/Capita (lagged 1 yr.)

Total Factor Productivity

Capital Stock

Human Capital Index

Private Enforcement
(lagged 3 yrs.)
Population

VARIABLES

TABLE 5!U.S. OUTPUT REGRESSIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL GDP PER CAPITA IN LOG FORM)
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66
0.998

66
0.998

-0.656
(0.853)

-1.251***
(0.302)
0.0840
(0.0797)
0.792***
(0.192)
0.712***
(0.159)
0.333***
(0.120)

-0.0178**
(0.00861)

(2)

66
0.998

-0.874
(1.001)

-1.187***
(0.379)
0.0648
(0.0990)
0.778***
(0.203)
0.718***
(0.162)
0.351**
(0.132)
-0.0763
(0.188)

-0.0180**
(0.00833)

(3)

66
0.998

-2.856*
(1.648)

-1.204***
(0.421)
-0.0549
(0.114)
1.016***
(0.237)
0.819***
(0.181)
0.372***
(0.124)
-0.286
(0.254)
-0.127*
(0.0748)
-0.00174
(0.00233)

66
0.998

-1.483
(1.923)

-1.390***
(0.466)
0.0608
(0.165)
0.917***
(0.254)
0.983***
(0.217)
0.256
(0.166)
-0.131
(0.322)
-0.0729
(0.0857)
0.00110
(0.00273)
0.259
(0.247)

-0.0192**
(0.00854)

(6)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

66
0.998

-1.883
(1.202)

-1.279***
(0.372)
-0.0270
(0.115)
0.960***
(0.235)
0.824***
(0.179)
0.372***
(0.123)
-0.344
(0.240)
-0.108
(0.0678)

-0.0212**
(0.00806)

MODELS
(5)

-0.0222***
(0.00818)

(4)

66
0.998

18.94
(16.47)

-4.611
(3.480)

-1.204***
(0.416)
-0.0648
(0.120)
1.035***
(0.237)
0.802***
(0.184)
0.371***
(0.125)
-0.252
(0.269)
-0.121
(0.0760)
-0.00233
(0.00253)

-0.0192**
(0.00759)

(7)

66
0.998

18.88
(16.63)

-4.597
(3.524)
-0.000330
(0.00611)

-1.195***
(0.442)
-0.0634
(0.129)
1.031***
(0.260)
0.803***
(0.186)
0.372***
(0.129)
-0.253
(0.272)
-0.121
(0.0765)
-0.00236
(0.00254)

-0.0193**
(0.00776)

(8)

61
0.998

20.97
(17.52)

-4.560
(3.580)
-0.00450
(0.00734)
-0.00654
(0.0446)

-1.264**
(0.619)
0.0496
(0.165)
0.821***
(0.265)
0.710**
(0.301)
0.444***
(0.140)
-0.101
(0.394)
-0.0735
(0.0813)
-0.000364
(0.00424)

-0.0219*
(0.0119)

(9)

53
0.998

-3.024
(3.498)
0.00111
(0.00766)
-0.119**
(0.0519)
-0.00568*
(0.00327)
21.23
(15.64)

-2.865***
(0.978)
0.0790
(0.361)
0.907*
(0.520)
0.898***
(0.307)
0.545**
(0.213)
0.380
(0.448)
-0.160
(0.102)
0.0119**
(0.00535)

-0.00810
(0.0117)

(10)
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No. of Observations
R-squared

Constant

Expected Inflation

Real Money Supply

Public Enforcement

Real Unit Total Cost

Real Unit Labor Cost

Time

Real Gov. Expenses

Openness Index

GDP/Capita (lagged 1 yr.)

Total Factor Productivity

Capital Stock

-2.046***
(0.698)

-1.834***
(0.196)
0.0650
(0.0736)
1.259***
(0.0866)
0.828***
(0.151)

Population

Human Capital Index

-0.0280***
(0.00759)

(1)

Private Enforcement
(lagged 6 yrs.)

VARIABLES

TABLE 6 –U.S. OUTPUT REGRESSIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL GDP PER CAPITA IN LOG FORM)
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B. ROBUSTNESS CHECK
For the robustness check, I focused on the negative short-run, 3year, and 6-year effects where statistical significance has been achieved
in almost all of the 10 regression models, as presented in Tables 4, 5 and
6 respectively.144 I added Private Enforcement lagged 3 !ears and
Private Enforcement lagged 6 !ears to the original 2SLS model as
variables of interest. This allows an evaluation of both short-run, 3-year,
and 6-year effects together. Since two new variables are included in the
model, I re-ran the first-stage regression to check whether Decisions was
still an acceptable instrumental variable. The result was positive. Table 8
shows that the Decisions variable is negatively and significantly
correlated with Private, meaning that it satisfies the relevance
assumption.
Next, I ran 2SLS regressions for the robustness check models. The
results are reported in Table 9. Concerning the short-run effect, the
regression analysis identified negative and significant associations
between private enforcement and output on the . # 0.1 or . # 0.05
levels. One percent increases in private enforcement are associated with
approximately 0.0571 to 0.151 percent decreases in the growth of real
GDP per capita. Such a result is largely consistent with the result of our
main model.145
Table 9 also shows that private enforcement has a negative effect
on output in the long run (i.e., 3 and 6 years ahead), which is consistent
with our main model in Tables 5 and 6. However, the results are not
statistically significant in any of the models even at . # 0.01 level,
meaning that they are likely to have occurred by chance only and are not
meaningful findings.
Thus, overall, my analysis provides evidence that private
enforcement has a negative effect on output in the short run but no
robust evidence that it has a negative effect in the long run.

144.
145.

Supra Tables 4-6.
Supra Table 4.
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IV. DISCUSSIONS: MECHANISM OF NEGATIVE IMPACT
Private antitrust enforcement could cause GDP to rise in both the
short run and the long run by reversing wrongdoings and enhancing
productivity, respectively. Inconsistent with the literature, my regression
analysis found that private enforcement has caused output to drop in the
short run and possibly in the long run as well. The following views are
largely speculative and meant to initiate a discussion on the causes of a
short-run negative output effect in the United States. In this Section, I
hypothesize that the negative output effect found in the United States is
an exceptional case that can be attributed to the expected high legal
costs defendants face.
Jonathan M. Jacobson, the former Chair of the ABA’s Section of
Antitrust Law, commented that “[a]ntitrust cases can take forever and
cost a fortune.”146 Jacobson shared that:
One of the first cases I worked on . . . was a private action follow-on
to United States v. Greater Buffalo Press. The events leading to that
case started in 1954. A grand jury was convened in 1958. No bill
was voted out, but Justice commenced a civil suit in 1960. A bench
trial took place in 1967, with judgment for the defense. On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court . . ., the judgment was reversed 9-0 and
the case sent back for divestiture of one of the printing plants
involved. So much time had passed, however, that by 1973 the case
terminated for lack of an interested buyer. The plant could not be
sold. The follow-on case was filed in 1974 . . . . The case was
litigated for eight more years, after which it settled!long before
expert reports, summary judgment, or trial. This was 28 years after
the relevant events.147

While this private case is an extreme example, it is true that, in
general, private antitrust actions are very costly in the United States. As
shown in a study by Steven C. Salop and Lawrence J. White, based on a
sample of non-multidistrict litigation (“non-MDL”) cases, the average
length of private antitrust litigations was 24.9 months.148 Their study
also revealed that when private plaintiffs win a judgment, courts order
146. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Tackling the Time and Cost of Antitrust Litigation, 32
ANTITRUST 3, 3 (2017).
147. Id.
148. Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Anal!sis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1009 (1986).
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defendants to compensate the plaintiffs $1,121,675 per case, on average
(all figures hereinafter are in 2019 dollars).149 Moreover, courts might
order defendants to pay the plaintiff’s legal fees.150 If so, such fees might
amount to some 20 percent of the compensation.151 Salop and White
found that over 70 percent of private antitrust cases were eventually
settled.152 For these cases, defendants, on average, paid settlements of
$1,662,834.153
In addition to using the data from the non-MDL case sample, Salop
and White conducted a survey to collect more data on costs.154 With the
additional information, the authors estimate that the average total legal
costs per private antitrust case (for the plaintiff and defendant sides
combined) were between $491,963 and $614,953.155 Additionally,
Kenneth G. Elzinga and William C. Wood suggest that most antitrust
lawyers are remunerated from direct billings and contingency fees
instead of fees awarded by courts.156 However, when there is such an
award, the defendant side is responsible for an average of $20,933 in
costs and $839,382 in attorney fees for the plaintiff.157
In the United States, private antitrust actions are usually brought as
class actions.158 Elzinga and Wood find that the average length of
private antitrust class action extends to 46.7 months, as compared to
24.9 months for non-class actions.159 Similarly, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
149. Id. at 1012. The figure reported by Salop and White was in 1984 dollars. For
easy comparison, I converted all figures in this part of the article into 2019-dollar
equivalents using the Consumer Price Index urban consumers (current series). U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 83.
150. Lai, supra note 115, at 488-90.
151. Salop & White, supra note 148, at 1013.
152. Id. at 1010.
153. Id.
154. Salop & White, supra note 148, at 1013.
155. Id. at 1015; See also Baker, supra note 33, at 42-43
(suggesting that the cost of private antitrust enforcement might be higher than what was
estimated by Salop and White (1986)).
156. Kenneth G. Elzinga & William C. Wood, The Costs of the Legal S!stem in
Private Antitrust Enforcement, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE,
NEW LEARNING 120 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988).
157. Id. at 121.
158. Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the European
Competition Forum: Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States
(Feb. 11, 2014).
159. Elzinga & Wood, supra note 156, at 111.
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found that antitrust class actions take an average of 37.38 months to
reach a settlement.160 Eventually, approximately 70 percent of antitrust
class actions end in settlement.161 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P.
Miller studied class action settlements for the period from 1993 to 2008
and found that, in the category of antitrust, wrongdoers compensated
plaintiffs an average amount of $194 million per class action settled
(attorney fees included).162 Fitzpatrick performed a similar study but
merely looked at settlements between 2006 and 2007.163 There, he
identified a mean settlement amount of $74 million for antitrust class
actions.164
On the damages side, an antitrust defendant can face substantial
penalties if found to have committed an antitrust violation. Two papers
by Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis can give some insight into how
much risk there is for antitrust wrongdoers. In their 2008 paper, Lande
and Davis analyzed forty then-recent and large-scale private antitrust
litigations.165 On average, the wrongdoers compensated the victims $623
million per case.166 That figure already includes attorney fees awarded to
the plaintiff but does not include non-cash compensation, such as
products, services, discounts, and coupons.167 In 2013, the same authors
published a similar paper, where they identified another twenty private
antitrust cases and showed that wrongdoers compensated the plaintiff
for $664 million, on average.168
160. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Stud! of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 820 (2010).
161. Lai, supra note 115, at 498.
162. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorne! Fees and E"penses in
Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 262 (2010).
163. I presume the figure reported by Fitzpatrick was in 2007 dollars. Fitzpatrick,
supra note 160, at 828.
164. Id.
165. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust
Enforcement: An Anal!sis of Fort! Cases, 42 UNIV. S.F.L. REV. 879, 889 (2008).
166. Id. at 891 n.46 (providing data according to its 2008 valuation); id. at 839.
From Appendix II, I found when the forty cases were decided. U.S. BUREAU LAB.
STAT., supra note 83. Then, I converted the recovery data (on the low side) in Table 1
to 2019-dollar equivalents. After the conversion, I calculated the average recovery per
case.
167. Lande & Davis, supra note 165, 891 n.46.
168. Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical
Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1269, 1275
(2013); U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 83.
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Altogether, companies sued by private parties for antitrust law
violations face significant financial consequences, ranging from a
million to hundreds of millions of dollars. Additionally, the defendants
need to spend substantial time handling the case. This likely contributes,
at least in part, to the short-run negative output effect discovered using
case filing numbers. It is because defendant companies likely have to set
aside resources for contingency use after learning about private antitrust
suits against them. For instance, defendant companies need to hire
lawyers to study the allegation and either pursue litigation or negotiate a
settlement with the plaintiffs. Then, when the case is resolved,
defendants may need to fund settlement payments or damages, requiring
additional capital. This is also not without opportunity costs for
defendants who need to spend or reserve this large sum of money. If
there were no lawsuits, the defendant companies could allocate those
same resources for immediate production use (increased GDP in the
short run) or for research and development purposes (increased GDP in
the long run). Moreover, there is an organizational impact, as these cases
require managerial focus to be directed towards the litigation and away
from increasing production and sales, impacting output negatively.
Furthermore, these potentially severe consequences of private
antitrust actions affect not only the target of such actions but also other
businesses in the economy. A negative output effect might exist if
private actions deter legal and productive business activities
(overdeterrence).169 For example, if a few competitors are considering
forming a cooperation agreement with each other that could boost
output. Such an agreement might involve some anticompetitive elements
but does not necessarily violate antitrust law (e.g., when its
procompetitive effect outweighs anticompetitive effect).170 However, the
companies may not be certain whether such an agreement is legal.171 In
169. See Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Antitrust Sanctions:
Deterrence and (Possibl!) Overdeterrence, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 643, 655 (2008).
170. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE, 246-48 (3d ed.
2017). This follows one of the fundamental principles in the U.S. antitrust law!rule of
reason. In practice, courts perform a “reasonable test” to evaluate the anti-competitive
and pro-competitive evidence submitted by the plaintiff and defendant, respectively. If
evidence presented shows that the pro-competitive effect of the challenged conduct
outweighs its anti-competitive effect, then the conduct is conceived as a reasonable
restraint of trade that does not violate antitrust law.
171. See Blair & Durrance, supra note 169 (explaining that such uncertainty exists
and depends on the intensity of antitrust sanctions).
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any event, the companies could still decide whether to enter into the
abovementioned agreement by comparing the expected benefit and cost
of doing so. The expected cost of forming that agreement is calculated
as the product of (1) the probability of being detected, sued, and
convicted and (2) penalties and litigation costs. When the amount of
private enforcements grows, companies perceive a higher chance of
being sued. In other words, holding other things equal, the greater the
number of private actions, the higher the expected cost rises. Companies
might therefore give up forming the agreement, negatively impacting
output in both the short and long run.172
If the negative output effect is indeed attributed to the high
consequence of private actions in the United States, then other
jurisdictions should not necessarily be discouraged from promoting
private antitrust enforcement. This is because the U.S. legal system has
some unique features that increase the incentive for antitrust plaintiffs to
sue. For example, in the United States, antitrust law provides treble
damages to victims,173 and discovery procedures are generally costly and
time-consuming, particularly in the context of antitrust.174 In addition,
some have expressed concern that the antitrust bar is overpaid in the
United States as compared to other jurisdictions.175 Moreover, U.S.
antitrust law has a one-way fee-shifting rule that is unfavorable to
defendants.176 The rule provides prevailing plaintiffs a right to recover
their cost of suit and attorney fees from the defendant’s side, but not the
other way around.177 All the aspects enumerated above vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.178 This incongruity between regions has two
consequences, first, in a less costly jurisdiction, companies being sued
172. See id. (explaining that procompetitive or competitively neutral conduct may
not be companies’ best practice when there is overdeterrence).
173. SHARIS POZEN ET AL., ANTITRUST LITIGATION, CHAMBERS GLOB. PRACTICE
GUIDE 12 (2019), https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/antitrustlitigation-2021 [https://perma.cc/REV2-DVHD].
174. Id. at 9; Jacobson, supra note 146.
175. Zygimantas Juska, The Effectiveness of Private Enforcement and Class Actions
to Secure Antitrust Enforcement, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 603, 622-23 (2017).
176. POZEN ET AL., supra note 173, at 15.
177. Id.
178. Jacobson, supra note 146. See Sinchit Lai, Incentivi$ing Private Antitrust
Enforcement to Promote Lenienc! Applications: A Case Stud! of the United Kingdom,
38 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 295-313 (2022), https://repository.arizona.edu/
handle/10150/663996 [https://perma.cc/49VC-C3AE] (showing some key features
under the U.K. and German legal systems).
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for antitrust violations face less severe consequences and may reserve
fewer resources for the case. Second, companies considering launching
a business activity that involves anticompetitive elements may be less
hesitant to do so. This is because businesses in jurisdictions with lower
penalties and litigation costs face a smaller expected cost for launching
business activity, assuming that the probability of a claim being filed in
such jurisdictions is identical to that of the United States. For these two
reasons, the average impact on output in many countries would be
smaller than that encountered in the United States.
The deterrent effect of antitrust litigation’s high costs is not the sole
factor in whether output rises or declines in response to a change in the
private antitrust filing numbers. As explained in the Introduction of this
Article, private enforcement could cause output to rise in the short run in
a few ways. Note that such positive effect mechanisms are not
contradictive or mutually exclusive to the negative effect mechanisms
discussed above. In summary, private enforcement affects at least three
groups of market players. The first category is comprised of the
wrongdoers being sued, and the overall impact on output is
undetermined. On the one hand, wrongdoers might suspend
anticompetitive conduct and restore production at a competitive level,
causing output to rise.179 On the other hand, wrongdoers might reserve
resources to prepare for penalties and litigation costs, causing output to
decrease. The second group is that of existing wrongdoers that have not
been sued and would-be wrongdoers; private enforcement imposes
desistance and deterrence effects on them, respectively, causing output
to rise.180 Finally, concerning companies that have not and do not intend
to violate antitrust law, private enforcement might discourage their
productive business activities, causing output to decline. Overall, when
the positive effects outweigh the negative effects, output rises, and vice
versa.
My research is exploratory. More work should be done to
determine: (1) whether private enforcement has a negative effect on
output in the United States and (2) whether such an effect is attributable
to the unique features of the U.S. legal system. If the answers to both
questions are positive, the next question is whether the negative output
effect could be reversed by reforming the legal system. One direction of
reforms worth exploring is lowering damages or litigation costs. While
179.
180.

See supra Part I.
Id.
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the United States has introduced reforms that make the legal system less
costly,181 there is still room for improvement.182 Poignantly, as Jonathan
M. Jacobson pointed out, while “130 or so nations have followed the
United States’ lead to create competition protection regimes, not one has
sought to replicate [its] litigation methodology.”183 This should be a red
flag. If future works do find that a negative output effect exists and is
unavoidable, it should not immediately jump to the conclusion that
society prefers fewer private actions. Policymakers should keep in mind
that private antitrust enforcement has many costs and benefits to
society.184 Output in the short run or economic growth in the long run is
merely one of the varied factors that policymakers should consider when
deciding whether to promote private antitrust enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
Using actual data for the period from 1954 to 2019, after addressing
endogeneity, this Article shows that the number of private antitrust case
filings has a negative and robust impact on the United States’ real GDP
per capita in the short run. Although such a negative effect might extend
to the long run, private enforcement does not appear to be robustly
associated with future real GDP per capita. I hypothesize that the
findings of this article are specific to the United States because of the
unique features of the country’s legal system. Specifically, I hypothesize
that the negative output effect is attributed to the severe consequences
faced by defendants in U.S. private antitrust actions. Additional study of
the effects of private enforcement on output and the role penalties and
litigation costs play in such relationships is warranted. These factors are
essential for legislators to evaluate the costs and benefits of private
antitrust enforcement and design a suitable mechanism accordingly.

181.
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Jacobson, supra note 146.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 266 (2d ed. 2001) (suggesting
antitrust enforcement mechanisms are deficient in “ensur[ing], at reasonable cost, a
reasonable degree of compliance”). See generall! David Klingsberg, Balancing the
Benefits and Detriments of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Detrebling, Antitrust Injur!,
Standing, and Other Proposed Solutions, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1215 (1988).
183. Jacobson, supra note 146.
184. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 108, at 543-44.

